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Global Infotech: Pathways to the Future with Global Partnerships
 Provide applications-specific level of 
reliability and security, while delivering 
optimal performance
 Customized levels of trust enforced via an 
integrated approach involving
• re-programmable hardware,
• compiler methods to: (i) extract 
security and reliability properties and 
(ii) accelerate computation
• configurable OS and middleware
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Reconfigurable processor-level hardware framework to provide 
application-aware checks for reliability and security
Processor, framework, and modules on single die
Framework and modules implemented on an FPGA
Framework configured to:
 embed hardware modules needed by application
 route inputs to modules
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Program Simplification
o Fission
o Fusion
o Distribution
o Strip-mining
o Recursion Removal
o Pointer Removal
o Data Structure Adjustment
o Memory Partitioning
Specialized Analysis
o Advanced Memory Dataflow
o Branch Correlation
o Value Flow
Pointer Analysis
o Advanced Flow-sensitivity
o Context Sensitivity
o Heap Cloning
o Field Sensitivity
o Pointer Arithmetic
o Scalability
Driving Applications
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Enable automated generation of hardware to prototype and 
demonstrate: (i) acceleration of computation and (ii) application-
aware detectors in realistic scenarios 
Middleware Services for Preventing 
DoS Attacks in Large-Scale Systems
Subset of trusted nodes 
called oversight nodes 
cooperate to manage node 
download information objects
Develop security middleware 
services to control multimedia 
streaming in a secure and 
robust fashion.
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Configurations (Möbius Modeling 
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Möbius atomic models 
represent different 
Trusted ILLIAC node 
designs and 
attack/fault models.
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Recovery
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Preserving system health using adaptive recovery
Model Driven Recovery Controller
  Path based monitors to detect failures
  Probabilistic Bayesian diagnosis to estimate cause of  failure
  Stochastic planning to choose recovery action
Model-Driven Trust Management
Choose security-critical variables 
based on application  semantics
Employ a compile-time static 
program analysis to 
• extract  backward slice which 
collates all dependent instructions 
along each control-path
• form a signature, which encodes 
dependences as a set (or 
sequence) of instruction PCs 
along each control-path
Program data-flow violations 
indicate of malicious tampering
Considering
• Misbehaving users
• Malicious users 
• Selfish users
Signature extraction 
Transform the derived signatures in 
the runtime assertions to be 
integrated within the application 
code or implemented in hardware 
for on-line error checking
